Some of the causes of political instability in Lesotho are related to the fact that secure livelihood is very difficult for majority of Basotho because Lesotho is a small country with limited natural resources. Against this background, allowing Basotho to gain access to citizenship of South Africa and other countries has been touted as one of the ways in which socio-economic well-being can be secured for majority of Basotho, and, thereby, political stability established in the country.
At present, Section 41 of Lesotho’s Constitution bars citizens of Lesotho from simultaneously holding citizenship of Lesotho and that of another country. This paper discusses legal and political issues pertaining to multiple-citizenship in Lesotho.
Primarily, the paper looks at the legal position regarding multiple-citizenship in Lesotho; the stance of Lesotho’s political elites on the subject; and examines the potential of multiple-citizenship to reduce political instability in Lesotho.
Lesotho is a small overcrowded country with a small economy that cannot support the well-being of society as a whole. Majority of the population are concentrated on the country’s ecological zone known as the ‘lowlands’, a small, arable but agriculturally-marginal and intensively cultivated strip of land that constitutes 17 percent of the country’s land mass.
Seventy-four per cent of the country’s topography comprises of the ‘foothills’ and ‘highlands’ where even more reduced capacity to grow food combines with other conditions, such as harsh climate and other inhospitable conditions, to make human habitation very difficult. Countrywide, in areas that are habitable, population density is estimated at 59 inhabitants per square kilometre.
Both under colonial rule (1868-1966) and after independence, economic survival has greatly depended on, and benefited from proximity with, more endowed South Africa. For society in general, Basotho’s ability to enter South Africa legally and illegally in search of jobs and necessities has provided a lifeline to many households in Lesotho.
For the Lesotho state, an old South Africa-dominated Customs Union, established during colonial rule, has been a major source of income and basis of national budgeting.
On both fronts, however, changes have occurred; two of these are worth mentioning. First, Basotho’s ability to move freely into South Africa in search of jobs has become increasingly restricted, as South Africa tightened its immigration controls, over the years. Second, Lesotho state’s income from the Customs Union, which contributes 44% of public spending,1 has fallen by close to 45%, from 29.2% of GDP, in 2014/2015, to 16.4% of GDP, in 2016/2017.2
This unfolding situation has contributed significantly to economic insecurity in Lesotho. Restrictions on Basotho’s cross-border movement into South Africa has increased their inability to access employment in South Africa, and has, thereby, increased unemployment in Lesotho, and intensified struggles for decent livelihood.
For many Basotho, the option has been to cross illegally, or to cross legally but end up violating South Africa’s immigration laws by overstaying, or working illegally. Cases of South African police’s arrests of Basotho found residing and working illegally in South Africa are quite frequent. They are sources of state-to-state tensions between governments of Lesotho and South Africa.
The view of South African government officials is that, Lesotho government do not do enough to help South Africa enforce its immigration laws. For their part, Lesotho government officials have to make representations, to the South African government, on behalf of Basotho who complain about ill-treatment and harassment, including deportations, by South African immigration officials.
Success and failure in struggles for power in Lesotho — which have increased in intensity, since 1993 — are, in large part, dependent on, first, the political elites’ access to public resources which they use to dispense patronage, and, second, on availability of an electorate rendered amenable to patronage because of its economic circumstances. On the one hand, dwindling income from Customs Union has meant that, the political elites do not have, at their disposal, enough means by which to dispense patronage; on the other hand, increased poverty and unemployment among the electorate has greatly increased the amenability of society to patronage.
This breeds political instability in that, the larger society is easily drawn into the intense struggles for state power between factions of the political elites. Sections of the larger population participate in these intense fights for state power hoping that victory of the sides they support will guarantee patronage from dwindling state resources.
Crucially, sections of larger society that become drawn into these struggles include elements in groups such as the army, and quasi-militarised groups of youth allied to different political parties and supported by elements in the army. It is in these ways that, intense struggles for state power that take place within a small section of society — that is to say, the political elite — become generalised throughout larger society and assume character of national political instability.
Because the persistent political instability that results from the economic and political contexts described above is ascribed, at least, in part, to Basotho’s being overcrowded on small, marginal territory with bleak current and future economic prospects, the search for ways of achieving political stability in Lesotho has focussed on areas, including: abolition of immigration controls on the border between Lesotho and South Africa, freedom for Basotho to work in South Africa, and repeal of Section 41 of Lesotho’s Constitution to enable Basotho to acquire citizenship of other countries in order to gain access to economic benefits that can accrue from citizenship of such countries.
This chapter discusses legal and political issues pertaining to multiple-citizenship in Lesotho. Primarily, the paper looks at the legal position regarding, and examines the stance of Lesotho’s political elites on, multiple-citizenship.
Evolution of Citizenship Legislation in Lesotho: Citizenship Legislation as a means to persecute Political Opponents
Among pre-colonial Basotho, bases of senses akin to ‘citizenship’ included membership of, or being born in, or having blood relations with members of, a community that formed a chiefdom; subjecthood to a particular chief; and having rights to territory claimed by that community, and ruled by the particular chief.
In law, the former — sense of belonging based on community and kinship — is called jus sanguinis, or ‘right of blood’; while the latter — that is, a sense of belonging based on birth and other rights to particular territory — is called jus soli, or ‘right to the soil’.
Basotho chiefdoms were small, largely autonomous, and loosely connected to each other by kin and other socio-political ties. In this arrangement, individuals and groups were free to choose which chiefdom they attached themselves to, or territory where they wanted to live.
As in notions of citizenship, as understood today, belonging to a community that occupied a particular territory, under a particular chief, carried with it obligations and rights. Individuals and groups could not be members of more than one community, or subjects of more than one chief, or enjoy right-to-territory in more than one territory; as a Sesotho saying goes, ‘no-one can be a subject of two chiefs’.
Those who preferred to live in a different territory could easily leave their current territory to go and make a living in another territory, under a different chief, or perhaps, found a new chiefdom.
Equally, individuals and groups who became unhappy under their current chief could easily leave him, and attach themselves to another chiefdom of their choice. In those cases, such individuals and groups lost, in particular, rights to land and resources of land that belonged to the previous community.
This ability of individuals and groups to leave a bad leader for a good leader put limits on the tendency of chiefs to abuse their powers: good chiefs attracted adherents, and bad chiefs lost adherents — or retained their allegiance by incurring costs on means of force by which to secure disgruntled subjects allegiance.
With colonisation, and in typical practices of empires, Basotho were regarded as subjects of the British Empire, and accorded some citizenship rights of the Empire, or the Commonwealth. These were mainly legal rights, and excluded Basotho from many political and social rights that were availed to European citizens of the Empire in England and in the colonies.
Within the region, modern Botswana, Lesotho, South Africa, and Swaziland were British colonies. For much of the colonial period, the British had a plan by which territories of Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland were to be incorporated into South Africa.
This plan informed much colonial policy-making for the envisaged future relationship between South Africa and the other territories. It was partly in accord with the incorporation plan that, the British managed a largely relaxed regime of people’s movement and residence rights within the four colonies, which continued for over fifty years after South Africa gained independence under white minority rule, in 1910.
Because of this relaxed regime of people’s movement and residence in the four colonies, where people called home was determined more by where people with whom they had strongest ties lived, than by membership of a nation and a country. Border restrictions between South Africa and Lesotho were introduced in July, 1963. That gave Basotho a sense of being excluded from South Africa, and, arguably, crystallised a sense of being ‘citizens’ of Lesotho, and not South Africa.
Immediately after independence, Lesotho parliament passed Lesotho Citizenship Act of 1967.
The Act was intended to “ . . . make provision, to the extent permitted or required by the Constitution, for the acquisition, deprivation and renunciation of citizenship of Lesotho . . . ” and “to specify, in relation to persons, by what date those persons shall have done what is required by the Constitution in relation to dual citizenship, and to make provision for related and connected matters.”5
The 1967 Act described, and allowed, citizenship by naturalisation and by registration. Beyond this, it seemed to assume jus soli and jus sanguinis citizenship rights; that is, other than those who could acquire citizenship by naturalization and registration, the law recognised, and the state could grant, citizenship rights to anyone born in Lesotho, and anyone with blood relatives in Lesotho could claim citizenship rights in the country. Applications, or claims, of citizenship could be made on the strength of a male, not female, parent’s citizenship of Lesotho.
Passage of the Act can be seen more as part of process of acquisition of trappings of nation-statehood at independence, and less as an instrument to deal with any political, social or economic problem that the new country was facing.
The 1967 Act was succeeded, only four years later, by Lesotho Citizenship Order No. 16 of 1971. The 1971 Order was substantially similar to its predecessor. Coming, as it did, in the aftermath of Chief Leabua Jonathan’s seizure of power by force, and his suspension of the Constitution, after losing elections of January, 1970, the Order seems more to have been intended as a means to circumvent constitutional requirements that the government needed to meet in its actions regarding recognising, granting, or depriving citizenship rights. Importantly, the Order made it possible for the regime to persecute its political opponents under the catch-all phrase ‘national security’.
Lesotho’s Citizenship Legislation and Multiple Citizenship
A primary relationship that states and rulers seek to establish and maintain with their subjects and citizens is one in which states and rulers exercise complete and undivided sovereignty over their citizens and subjects. However, objective political and economic conditions of human existence have always been such that, individuals and groups often find themselves having to break away from oppressive rulers, or to seek making a living in other ‘greener’ territories.
Attempts may be of a complete break, in which individuals and groups permanently renounce territorial rights and rights of membership to a particular nation, or community; or an incomplete break in which individuals and groups maintain, or wish to maintain, rights in previous territory and previous community.
This tension—between states and rulers seeking to establish and maintain complete and undivided sovereignty over subjects and citizens, on the one hand, and individuals and groups seeking to break away, partly or completely, and establish themselves in politically less oppressive, and economically more beneficial circumstances, on the other — has a long history and continues in modern times.
Responses of states and rulers have varied. Some have hung steadfastly to laws that prohibit multiple citizenship; while some have made adjustments that give ‘non-citizens’ varying degrees of rights, from outright citizenship, at one extreme, to limited rights of movements, civic participation, and socio-economic rights, at another. Such is the case, for example, in the European Union, whose member countries practise what is called disaggregated citizenship.
Lesotho’s Citizenship Act of 1967 made reference to ‘dual citizenship’ with an intention to eliminate it. Sections 4, 5 and 7 of the Citizenship Order of 1971 required applicants of Lesotho citizenship to be “willing to take an oath of allegiance”, and to be “willing to renounce any other nationality or citizenship” that they might be enjoying at time of applying for citizenship of Lesotho.
With intention to prohibit dual citizenship, Section 41(1) of Lesotho’s 1993 Constitution clearly states that “[a]ny person who… is a citizen of Lesotho and also a citizen of some country other than Lesotho shall cease to be a citizen of Lesotho… unless he has renounced his citizenship of that other country, taken the oath of allegiance…”9
Lesotho Political Elites’ Attitude Towards Multiple Citizenship
There are not clearly-stated reasons why Lesotho political elites — writers of the Constitution, legislators, cabinet ministers, etc. — are opposed to dual citizenship. It can only be surmised that, the bases for their objections include fears of state’s loss of complete rights to its citizens and, perhaps, issues of national security.
However, as with Citizenship Order of 1971, it can be said with certainty that, citizenship legislation enables whoever is in power to persecute political opponents. Thus, when, in 2007, officials of the government of Lesotho sought to deport Adam Lekhoaba — a broadcaster who had run programmes critical of the ruling party — they accused him of both being an alien and of causing political instability in the country.
This section of the paper discusses some of the publically-stated concerns against changing Section 41 of the country’s Constitution with a view to allow the holding of Lesotho’s citizenship with that of another country, or other countries.
Being words by individuals who write and enact Lesotho’s laws, and rule the country, the statements reported here, and the attitudes of those who made them towards multiple citizenship, can be taken as some explanation of prohibition of multiple citizenship in Lesotho’s Constitution and subordinate laws.
One of the most powerful voices that have publically expressed fears and concerns about changing Section 41 of Lesotho’s Constitution to make dual citizenship possible is that of Dr Pakalitha Mosisili, several times Prime Minster of Lesotho.
Dr Mosisili has expressed concern that, changing Section 41 of Lesotho’s Constitution will make it possible for South Africans to vote in Lesotho’s national elections. As can be seen, below, he persuades his followers to join his opposition to dual citizenship by invoking the ‘spectre’ of Lesotho’s incorporation into South Africa. The rhetoric lacks either any nationalist substance, or logic, of any type.
Speaking during a brief period when he was out of power, in April 2013, he told his followers:
There are 46 million people in South Africa comprising Basotho, Shanganis and Zulus. If we were to allow for dual citizenship, they would swallow us raw because they will also seek Lesotho citizenship . . . This is one way this… government is intending to hand us over to South Africa. I therefore urge you people to be careful, very careful.
Beyond glib references to a “ . . . danger lurking on the horizon . . . ” if Lesotho allows dual citizenship; equating dual citizenship to “ . . . selling out Lesotho to South Africa . . . ”; and sowing fears of Lesotho being “ . . . swallowed by South Africa”, politicians opposed to dual citizenship, such as Dr Mosisili, are not able to state clearly what is wrong with dual citizenship.
Contrary to their views, participation of South Africans who hold Lesotho’s citizenship in Lesotho politics may, indeed, be a good thing for Lesotho democracy in that, Lesotho’s politicians and their parties will have to think about an electorate with a different political consciousness in their attempts to gain power.
Anyhow, for anyone to vote in Lesotho’s elections they have to be citizens. As things stand, it is more likely that people from Lesotho will apply for South African citizenship than South Africans apply for citizenship of Lesotho.
Seemingly, this opposition to dual citizenship is not limited to Lesotho’s political elites but it exists among other sections of Basotho society. Thus, in 2013, a survey conducted for AfroBarometer found that “ . . . a majority of survey respondents — 60% — said people do not have a right to be citizens of Lesotho and a second country.” Significantly, however, the survey found that, of the six southern African countries where similar surveys were conducted, even at 33%, support for dual citizenship in Lesotho was the highest, surpassing that of the next country, South Africa, by ten percentage points. Of the other countries, Zimbabwe scored 22%, Namibia 20%, Botswana 13%, and Malawi 11%.
Even more significant, perhaps, is the fact that, research evidence has been presented showing various levels of support for an even more contentious idea of incorporation. According to this research,
. . .41% of Basotho migrants continue to favour integration. Within Lesotho, 46% of respondents also support incorporation. But residents in the North appear most interested in the prospect of becoming part of South Africa, in contrast with the inhabitants of the Maseru region (56% against it), where the interest of many lies in preserving the status quo.
Some of the opposition to the idea of dual citizenship, such as that attributed to Prime Minister Mosisili above, gives the impression that, if the law is changed, all Basotho will be required to apply for dual citizenship from, in particular, South Africa. First, the changed law would not prescribe countries from which Basotho should apply for dual citizenship.
Secondly, and, perhaps, more importantly, changing Section 41 of Lesotho’s 1993 Constitution will not force all Basotho to apply for South African citizenship, or any other country’s citizenship. Those who will not want to do so will be free to remain with Lesotho’s citizenship alone, and, by doing so, they will not be breaking any law.
Majority of Basotho may opt not to apply for dual citizenship, but, like all Basotho, they will enjoy the freedom of choice that will result from removal of constitutional prohibition against dual citizenship.
By: Motlatsi Thabane
China initiates strategy to influence African parliaments
THE People’s Republic of China has fully financed the construction of at least 15 new African parliamentary buildings and refurbished and furnished several others on the continent.
Its method of donating parliament buildings – controlling their design, construction and long-term maintenance – seems designed to embed its influence in parliamentary institutions in order to have recurrent access to dominant cross-party elites. Innocent Batsani-Ncube examines China’s delivery of one such building in Lesotho.
China’s offer to build a new parliament for Lesotho can be understood as a bid to influence the soul of the Lesotho political system.
The offer was first made during Prime Minister Pakalitha Mosisili’s trip to China in 2005 and remade during the then-Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing’s visit to Lesotho in January 2006. It answered Lesotho’s need for a purpose-built parliament building, part of the parliamentary reform programme outlined by the government in 2004.
At the time of Mosisili’s visit to China in December 2005, he was also the incoming 2006-2007 Southern African Development Community (SADC) chairperson.
In this role, he would later play an important role at the 2006 FOCAC Summit in Beijing. On behalf of SADC, he was given the opportunity to address the opening ceremony of the High-level Dialogue and the Second Conference of Chinese and African Entrepreneurs.
The timing of the parliament building donation was possibly tied to the cumulative strategic importance of Lesotho at the time.
While the donation fulfilled an existing need in Lesotho, the mode of project execution indicates China’s intentions to leverage the gift for long term political influence in the parliamentary institution.
Parliament is Lesotho’s most visible, enduring and central political institution. It consists of the King, the Senate and National Assembly. The King summons Parliament and formally approves legislation through royal assent.
The executive is drawn from parliament and its leader, the Prime Minister has to command a majority in the National Assembly. In essence, parliament is the soul of the Lesotho political system.
In executing the parliament building project, China deliberately side-lined earlier plans developed by the Lesotho government’s multi-stakeholder steering committee. The steering committee that drew members from the Lesotho National Assembly, Senate, Ministry of Public Works’ Building Design Services (BDS), Maseru City Council and Ministry of Finance had produced a design template for the building in 2004.
Instead, China nominated the China Northeast Architectural Design and Research Institute to produce a separate design and appointed the Chinese Yanjian Group construction firm to construct the building. The firm employed Chinese artisans – such as carpenters, bricklayers, plumbers and electricians – in key roles. Basotho artisans were employed as labourers at worst and trainees at best.
The net effect of China’s dominance in the design and implementation of the building project was that the final product reflected more the desires of the giver and less the wishes of the recipient.
The contractor was supervised by a Chinese technical design team instead of the BDS. The role of the BDS was limited to monitoring the technical design team that was supervising the contractors. The Chinese construction firm applied Chinese construction standards and materials specification.
Chinese contractors have been maintaining the building since it was completed. They have established a semi-permanent work compound at the foot of the Mpilo Hill where the Parliament building is located. The compound precast wall is emblazoned with the words ‘Chinese Technical Team,’ taking care of the new Lesotho Parliament building and a visible China aid logo at its gate.
Lesotho government officials have conceded that they do not have the technical people to take care of the building and need to continuously extend the contract for the Chinese technical teams so that they assist in taking care of the building.
The octopus-like grip on the building’s value chain seems to have been deliberate and meant to guarantee China’s long-term presence in Lesotho. In constructing the building in this manner, China sought to make itself indispensable to the management and maintenance of the Lesotho parliament building.
This would grant China continuous access to Lesotho’s political system and secure its long-term foreign policy interests.
China’s direct engagement in Lesotho’s parliament building has partly enabled it to maintain and consolidate relations with successive governments. When China offered to build the parliament of Lesotho, the Lesotho Congress of Democrats (LCD) and Pakalitha Mosisili were the governing party and Prime Minister respectively.
At the time, the Thomas Thabane’s All Basotho Congress (ABC) was the official opposition. However, by the time the building was completed the roles had changed, the ABC was now the governing party with Thabane as the Prime Minister. They have also dealt with two more – the Moeketsi Majoro and Sam Matekane administrations.
In sum, China’s method of constructing the Lesotho parliament building point to a self-interested nature of its parliament development and indicates a stronger vested interest in domestic mutli-party political institutions than most commentators think.
Instead of backing a single political player, China has adapted its strategy to hedge its bets. While political elites come and go, there have been two constants: China and the parliamentary institution.
- Dr Innocent Batsani-Ncube is a Usawa Postdoctoral Research Fellow within the Politics Department’s political economy and infrastructure thematic cluster. He specialises in the politics and political economy of intra-global South relations, in particular, the relations between China (state and business actors) and African, Caribbean and Pacific States.
Let’s establish a national airline
Sesotho se re, mokopi ke mokokomali. Hee feela Basotho ba rata liphallelo. Hell! U fumane ba se ba kokometse ha hothoe liphallelo li teng. Feela, ha u ka re, lemang Basotho, u tla fumana masimo a omme ngo!
I’m referring to a news item I saw on Lesotho Television last week. The American Embassy had invited Basotho to apply for grants for various projects. This was held at the State Library in a section of the library called the American Corner.
Jesus! When the state library appeared on TV, it looked like a slaughter-house from a horror movie or a haunted house from one of those novels written by Stephen King. It looks very dingy for a ‘National Library’.
But I’m sure that five containers of paint (20 litres buckets) could have, at the very least covered the grime on the face of the State Library before it appeared on TV. Television is a very powerful medium.
Look, one bucket (20 litres) of paint costs about M895 and the library needs about five buckets for a face-lift at a cost of M4,475.00 (in total), instead of appearing on TV looking so scary. These are some of the fallen fruits that new RFP administration should have started with. Or should I donate some paint to facelift the library? Do I see any hands/volunteers?
In any case, I’m sure we all remember how our old primary and high school teachers used to embarrass us. They’d hit you with a duster on the forehead and sometimes you’d find you have a new GF in the same classroom and they would see you being smacked on the forehead. With all the chalk-dust landing on the face. The eyes would be red and full of tears due to the embarrassment.
But hey, the dusters seemed to do the work especially when the head refused to dispense correct answers. But we need to bring those dusters back. Ekare boroko bo bongata ka hara ‘muso oa RFP.
We need a teacher with a duster in one of the cabinet meetings. A re wake-up! Wake-up! Wake-up! On the forehead.
But I must be frank though, Ntate Lebona seems to be the only one carrying the entire weight of the new government on his shoulders. That man is a hard worker. He seems to be the only one with a sense of direction and vision.
No, seriously. I don’t know if I’m the only one, but things seem to be pretty much the same under the ‘new’ RFP administration. One doesn’t really get a sense that there’s a new government in charge. Yes, a new broom.
I mean, Kingsway Street is still dirty, filthy and dark at night (Yes, some of the lights are working). The Cathedral Circle precinct is still dirty and filthy. Grown men still urinate on the fence of the Cathedral. The flood-light (Apollo-light) located at the cathedral circle still doesn’t work (Yes, it doesn’t work).
The flag-poles around the Cathedral-Circle are still without the national flags. Guys! How much does it cost to put-up flags around this national monument?
Where are national flags at the border post? Where are the national flags at the entrance of the airport? These are fallen fruits and they don’t cost much to implement.
Why don’t they reinstate the tree-planting day? When was it held? 21st March? This should be a national tree-planting and cleaning day. Baitšukuli should also be forced to clean the Kingsway Road where they work. It’s only fair. This is the main artery of the capital city. This has to be our cleanest street. Let’s just keep it clean!
But I want to talk about a very sensitive issue. The use/usage of Ntate Matekane’s Jet for official trips. Is it right or wrong?
This issue has split opinion on so many levels. Especially when the jet is used by His Majesty for official trips. Now, this always give me shivers down the spine. Kee ke utloe ‘mele oaka o baleha.
You see, the nature of politics is that at one point, you become the most loved person in the world. Then suddenly, you become the most hated person on the face of the earth. Ask Ntate Tom or Ntate Majoro. They can tell you a story or two.
Knowing how the minds of Basotho work, there’ll come a time when Basotho are fed up with Ntate Matekane and want him gone as in yesterday. You’ll hear them all over the radio saying, “Hee rona re khathetse ke ‘muso ona oa barui.”
Now, you don’t want people to bring uncomfortable issues when they want them out of the office. You’d rather play your cards openly and above the table. Unfortunately, this issue of the usage of the private aircraft, is not as transparent as we’d want it to appear.
But Ntate Matekane actually has an opportunity to turn things around. Why not establish a national airline/carrier so that things are above board?
This will also give His Majesty an opportunity to board the ‘national plane’ with a clear conscience. It will also relieve us (the general public) the burden of carrying uncomfortable questions that we’re too afraid to ask.
As a matter of fact, there’s one journalist, Lekhooa Tšolo (Mlani) from Harvest FM that got ridiculed for asking whether Ntate Matekane paid for the recent trip to Mozambique from his pocket or whether the state was taking care of the bill.
In other words, did the Lesotho government lease Ntate Matekane’s jet for the trip to Mozambique? These are obviously, very uncomfortable questions hence the hostility from one of the cabinet ministers. “Ha re’a tla ka taba eno mona”, was his response.
This issue of using private assets also places the army in a very compromised situation. I mean, once you become a Prime Minister, you become an asset of the State and who is in charge of the safety and security of the Prime Minister? My hero, Major General Letsoela.
Now, should anything happen (God forbid) to Ntate Matekane, the sword falls on Ntate Letsoela. He’ll have to account and all eyes will be on him. Unfortunately!
And this reminds me of the stunts that Donald Trump tried to pull when he became president of the US. Yes, Donald Trump has it all. All the riches of the world. He even said, “No, I don’t need your money. I’m here to provide a service and I will work free of charge.”
The State said, Butle Buti. Remember, once you assume office, you become a public servant. And you have to appear on the government/state payroll. We have to comply with the rules and regulations. That is the reason why Donald Trump ended up being paid $1 as monthly salary from the state.
Donald Trump had to use state vehicles and a state owned jet (Air-force-One). Despite owning his own private jets and helicopters. Even now, during his retirement, he’s still a property of the state. Those are the rules and regulations.
In closing, like Major General Lekhanya did with purchasing a jet named Lengau, maybe it is an opportune moment for the state to establish a national airline that will also be used for cargo purposes as well. It could also help to boost the tourism sector.
In fact I have an idea on how we can establish an airline. Why not lease one jet from the Emirates or Qatar Airlines and operate it as Lesotho Airlines (with a national flag/colours), on the Maseru, Johannesburg, Dubai, Beijing/China Route? Do you see the reason why I added Beijing on that list?
And it should be managed and operated by Emirates or Qatar. In that way, we minimise the risk of losses, risk of corruption and we get international exposure. Maybe route-two could be Maseru-Johannesburg-Dubai-New York. For AGOA exports.
And I don’t think the Emiratis would say no to this proposal. So, the China route could also bring a lot of tourists into the Mountain Kingdom. For a new trend in tourism named: Digital detox Resorts (Google search it).
Even here, Dr Matlanyane should negotiate this deal for us as the Minister of Foreign Affairs. It will restore a sense of national pride.
Remember the embarrassment and torment that our army had to face when they had to ship their cargo to Mozambique. Ba tlameha ho kopa lift fofaneng sa Angola. Sesotho se re, mokopi ke mokomali!
The Ngugi, Mungoshi dynasties
Literature dynasties of sorts are emerging in Africa. People in families of certain established authors are turning out to be writers and artistes of note. Brothers, wives, cousins, children and grandchildren of long established writers are taking to the pen with direct or indirect encouragement of the presence of a major writer in the family.
In Kenya there is the Ngugi dynasty while in Zimbabwe there is the Mungoshi dynasty. These families have become dominant actors in the literature of the two African countries.
Ngugi Wa Thiongo is a household name in African literature. He is best known for his first novel Weep Not, Child. His other novels – The River Between, A Grain of Wheat, Matigari and Petals of Blood – confirmed his stature as one of the major African writers of our time.
Ngugi, who turned 85 in January this year, is currently a Distinguished Professor of English and Comparative Literature at the University of California, Irvine, and is still writing.
However, his sons — Tee Ngugi, Nducu wa Ngugi, Mukoma wa Ngugi and his daughter, Wanjiku wa Ngugi are all published authors, showing the father’s influence on his family.
Tee Ngugi, the eldest of Ngugi’s offspring is a writer, columnist and singer-songwriter of note. His short fiction, essays and commentaries have appeared in several publications including New Orleans Review, St Petersburg Review, Kwani, Brittle Paper, Timbuktu, New Black Magazine, Jahazi, and The East African, among others. His collection of short stories, Seasons of Love and
Despair, was published in 2015 by East African Educational Publishers. A graduate of Yale, Tee has worked in the academic and NGO sectors in Zimbabwe, Namibia and Kenya. He lives in Nairobi, Kenya.
In his short story called ‘Light from the Chapel,’ Tee Ngugi writes about the girl, Noni, who grows from innocence to experience in a religious set-up.
When she is in high school, she naively believes in the purity of priests, nuns and all religious people.
Noni thinks that sin is a far away thing for all people who follow the cross. Then suddenly she catches the local church priest in a very compromising position!
Noni is also starting to realise that: “There is a mysterious space where pure sexual and spiritual experiences connect…” She discovers that spiritual ecstasy appears to be in tandem with coital energy.
Later, at university, now a more “reasonable” Marxist feminist, Noni appears to learn that reality is universal and we only give it different names depending on where we stand and that Christianity, marxism and feminism tend to coalesce in their findings about mankind.
Meanwhile, Tee’s sibling, Nducu wa Ngugi is an educator and writer with noticeable art activities in Atlanta, Georgia, USA. Nducu’s writing has appeared in such magazines as Wajibu and Pambazuka.
“I do not feel pressure knowing my dad is who he is, I enjoy writing,” says Nducu to one online journalist. Nducu has published novels such as City Murders, The Dead Came Calling and Benji’s Big Win.
In The Dead Came Calling, a detective novel, Nducu writes about an Indian businessman, Vishal Mehta, who is found murdered inside his garage in Tigoni, Limuru.
Then Jack Chidi, an investigative reporter with The Daily Grind, is called in to investigate. Jack has no idea why Mehta’s wife, Anarupa Mehta, has decided to call him. She informs him that it was Mehta, who had asked her to call him should anything happen to him, a few weeks before his death, signalling that he knew his life was in danger.
Jack’s life is in danger as he discovers that the killing of Vishal exposes an international ring of criminals.
My own estimation is that Mukoma Wa Ngugi could be the most academically gifted of all the offspring of Ngugi Wa Thiongo. An Associate Professor of Literatures in English at Cornell University, Mukoma is fast becoming one of the key names in African literary scholarship. Mukoma is the author of The Rise of the African Novel: Politics of Language, Identity and Ownership, the novels Mrs. Shaw, Black Star Nairobi, Nairobi Heat, and two books of poetry, Logotherapy and Hurling Words at Consciousness. Often Mukoma appears alongside his father, conducting many public lectures across the world.
His father often smiles approvingly as his erudite son explains very complex issues in African literature and politics.
Ngugi Wa thiongo’s daughter, Wanjiku Wa Ngugi is the author of the novel The Fall of Saints (2014) and she is a former director of the Helsinki African Film Festival (HAFF).
She was a columnist for the Finnish development magazine Maailman Kuvalehti, as well as a jury member of the Cinema Africa Film Festival, Sweden. Her story ‘Hundred Acres of Marshland’ was published in New Daughters of Africa: An International Anthology of Writing by Women of African Descent, edited by Margaret Busby (2019). Her short stories and essays have appeared in Nairobi Noir, Houston Noir, St. Petersburg Review, Auburn Avenue and Barelife Review, among others.
Meanwhile, the late Charles Mungoshi of Zimbabwe is also a household name in African literature. His literary profile is compact. He was a novelist, poet, short-story writer, playwright, film script writer, actor, editor, translator and consultant.
His last book, Branching Streams Flow in the Dark published in 2013 after a long break due to illness is a transcendental novel; marking then the long awaited ‘return’ of leading Zimbabwean author, Charles Muzuva Mungoshi.
The prize-winning author of Coming of The Dry Season, Waiting For The Rain regular Kunyarara Hakusi Kutaura? who had been ‘silent’ ever since his major single publication, Walking Still in 1997, had chosen a special way of returning. As his wife, the acclaimed actress Jesesi Mungoshi states in the dedicatory note, ‘it took Charles over 20 years to write this book and he was still perusing through it when he fell into a coma on the 30th of April, 2010’.
It is therefore befitting that this book is about living beyond malady. During her darkest and loneliest moment, when her baby dies of AIDS and her husband runs out of the house and her mother is virtually unkind, Serina Maseko sees through herself and others, as if she were beyond pain and reproach. She is floating because during this period, before the advent of Anti Retro Viral
Therapy use in the management of the Acquired Immuno-Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS), being diagnosed as having the infection is an automatic death sentence.
Serina begins to write a very long and winding letter to a long-forgotten school mate, Fungisai Bare. In that letter, Serina forages through her turbulent life and that of people around her, confessing her sins and confronting all the ghosts in her life, searching for certain key moments to hold on to.
And then Serina comes across one Saidi on a city bus. It is just by chance! As you read on, you want Serina and Saidi to fall in love. You tell your foolish self that this is love at first sight! It is because Serina and Saidi are forlorn because they have AIDS.
But Serina soon learns that Saidi is and has been much closer to her than she has ever known. Saidi leads Serina to her long lost father – the evergreen Samuel Maseko. Saidi leads Serina to her runaway husband, the brilliant coward – Michael Gwemende.
Saidi leads Serina to his own mother, Samuel Maseko’s first wife – the indefatigable Stella Mkandhla Dube! Finally, Saidi leads Serina to a path into herself.
All these ‘streams’ begin to branch into what was threatening to remain unknown. Here, as in the novels of Jose Saramago, especially Blindness, seeing can be both disease and recuperation. Mungoshi died in February 2019.
Charles Mungoshi’s younger brother, the late David Mungoshi, who died a year later in August 2020, appeared to always having followed his elder brother’s footsteps in literature ever since their childhood herding cattle in Manyene. They share a warm relationship of exchanging books and writing techniques. Their physical resemblance tended to confuse many.
Only a few years before Charles published a book about a woman with HIV/AIDS, David published a book, about a woman with cancer in 2009! It is called The Fading Sun. It is a novel about both living and dying.
Very few novels from Zimbabwe will come close to it as regards exploring a miscellany of human emotions and experiences in one breath. Here is sadness, bottomless joy, puzzlement, memories, regrets, fear… the whirlpool goes on.
A woman in menopause stops in her tracks to take stock of her life. From the leeward side, Mary has more than her fair share of maladies. Mary’s skin is wrinkled. Mary suffers from bouts of migraine and arthritis. Mary has had each of her three deliveries by caesarean section.
Mary has lost one of her ovaries early in life. Mary has a thyroid problem which has led to thyroidechtomy.
Mary has lost one of her breasts through mastectomy and she wears the breast prosthesis. Sadly, the surviving breast is also deteriorating and the pain is just unbearable. Mary’s sun is slowly fading.
She makes you realise that much of living and dying too, go on inside of the individual. Towards the end, she becomes very mystical like that woman who charms and is charmed in return by the spider in ‘A Passage to India’.
Midway, you realise that this is a novel that you cannot take all in, with a one off reading. The layers are many; history, geography, anthropology, politics… This novel must have taken David Mungoshi lots of meditation (and fasting too) that when such a script was finally released, he must have felt like collapsing from the sudden release.
In addition, David used a rigorous language and you may suggest that this story must be sung with the accompaniment of an instrument. This book pitches much higher than what David achieves with his debut novel, Stains On The Wall (1992). It is the kind of English language with the rigor you can only associate with the other good non-English writers writing in English, like Joseph Conrad and Ayi-Kwei Armah.
In 2016 Charles Mungoshi’s first born son, Farayi published a scintillating collection of poems called Behind the Walls Everywhere. Farayi Mungoshi’s short stories stun with their shocking intensity and tenderness.
Almost everywhere – from the bridge on the road that leads into the township and from the top of the all knowing tower light, and even from within the house of mourning, to the faraway lands of their supposed refuge – men and women, black and white, strip off their masks to reveal passion at its most elemental and sublime.
Here is a powerful and wild book, containing the genuine short story, sincere, individual and strictly economical. Farayi is also a film-maker.
Farayi’s younger brother, Charles Mungoshi Jnr is also a writer of motivational books. He is a regular voice on the social media scene, motivating people to carry on with their lives. In 2016 he published five motivational books on the same day!
To cap it all, their mother Jessesi Mungoshi, wife to the late Charles Mungoshi himself, is a household name after starring as Neria in the film Neria. It is a story about the challenges that widows face in African communities. The Neria role was career defining for Jessesi, who is still referred to by the name of the movie’s main character by fans.
“Here in Zimbabwe and neighbouring countries, I’m strongly identified with the character I played in the film. Some do not even know my real name!” she tells one publication.
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